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BOOK REVIEWS
The Modern Corporation and Private Property. By Adolf A.
Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1932. Pp. xiii, 396. $3.75.
There is a paper government for corporations and there is an
actual government. The one is embodied in constitutional provisions, statutes, charters, by-laws, decisions; the other has its
being in the conduct of men who control corporate activity. The
one may arise from ethical ideals or from legal and economic
philosophies; the other is made up of blunt, realistic facts.
Theoretically the paper government and the actual government
can and should coincide. As a practical matter they do not.
With them as with all human institutions there is a divergence
of the intended and the realized, the ought and the is. When
the separation is relatively small and development is not too
rapid the paper government and the actual grow together and
act as salutary checks upon each other. When development of
corporate activity is stimulated to a rapidity that leaves the
paper government groping, the reciprocal checks of the two governments upon each othee lose their balance and the resultant effect may be anything but salutary. A reexamination of premises
becomes necessary. A survey must be made of the factual
ground into which the paper government must drive its roots.
One should approach this book by Messrs. Berle and Means
with these thoughts well in mind. Especially is it imperative
for a lawyer whose mind is steeped in conventional corporation
law literature to remember them; otherwise he may read the
book word for word, yet miss its essential significance. Thus,
Professor Wormser, author of so bold a title as Frankenstein,
Incorporated, because of the shock he was given by a face to
face encounter with the Frankenstein here revealed, cried "socialism!"' as though that shibboleth would exercise the monster,
and despite the fact that the authors are at least conservative
enough to contribute to the so-called "brain trust" of our capitalistic President. "Things are either legal or illegal," he says.
"The profits of a corporation properly may be disbursed only in
accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the articles
of incorporation or charter.' 2 Right. But the argument misses
the mark, is bad on demurrer. If too many things are illegal
and too many profits are improperly disbursed, if legal remedies
are for practical purposes unavailable or prohibitively costly,
if factors begin to appear of which present law and other traditional social institutions take no account, then there are prob1 Review by L Maurice Wormser in (1933) 19 A. B. A. Journ. 113.
2Ibid. Italicization inserted.
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lems. And those are the problems that called forth The Modern Corporation and Private Property.
In the opening third of the book Mr. Means unfolds for us a
panoramic statistical picture of our two hundred largest corporations, most of them with gross assets well over a hundred
million dollars. These two hundred companies control about
forty-five to fifty-three per cent of the nation's non-banking
corporate wealth. They control thirty-five to forty-five per
cent of non-banking business wealth and fifteen to twenty-five
per cent of the national wealth as a whole. Furthermore, they
have been growing both in gross assets and income at a rate
between two and three times as fast as other non-financial corporations. "It would take only forty years at the 1909-1929
rates or only thirty years at the 1924-1929 rates for all corporate activity and practically all industrial activity to be absorbed by two hundred giant companies." The stockholding of
the Two Hundred are scattered widely and divided into comparatively small units. In only six per cent of them is the stock
privately owned with no important holdings by the public. In
only an additional five per cent is the stock sufficiently concentrated for majority control. The rest of them are obviously not
controlled by the stockholding owners. They are governed by
a minority or through some factual or legal devise whereby decisions for the corporation are made independently of ownership. The shareholder somewhere in the evolution of the corporate system has lost an ancient incident of his property. He
has lost "control." His property has become "passive"; that is,
he holds merely a piece of paper representing an equity on
which he hopes to get a return. In a word his Ptolemaic corporate universe has become Copernican. He is no longer the
gravitational center. "Control" is.
The thesis introduced by Mr. Means is traced in its legal developments by Mr. Berle. He outlines the history of the separate jolts by which "control" has been broken loose from the
shareholder. There was, for example, the shareholder's most
powerful weapon, his vote. The first smash at his voting power
was the proxy. Then the power of amotion was legislated and
litigated out of existence. Charters began to appear giving the
management broad independent discretion to engage in a variety of businesses. The delegation of control to voting trusts
was legalized. Disfranchised stock appeared. And finally a
majority of shareholders was given power by lease or sale to
turn over the entire corporation to a management independent
of former participants. At the same time the dominant subject
in the stockholding scene has changed from a comparatively
small, localized group with a common interest to a scattered,
unorganized multitude of individuals who know almost nothing
about the enterprise in which they own equities. The holder
of shares in one of the Two Hundred, if his shares carry a voting power, if a particular question is one on which he is author-

INDIANA LAW JOURNAL

ized to exercise that power, if he is intelligent enough to make
a decision on that question and if he is interested enough to
attend the meeting, may vote as it is theoretically contemplated
that he should. The "control" will remain unruffled.
The growth of independent corporate "control" was undoubtedly a natural concomitant of the growth of large corporate units. It was inevitable that the power to make quickly
important decisions would have to be lodged in the management
or in some unified small group back of the management, for the
shareholders' voting machinery is too cumbersome and the
shareholders are too greatly dispersed both geographically and
mentally. But the fact that independent "control" has developed
has never been emphasized sufficiently. The concept of "control" as such must be made an important element of legal
thought. One has but to compare the picture of actual corporate
activity disclosed in this book with the conventional orthodox
legal picture to realize to what an extent the actual government
and the paper government have become separated. The utmost
postulates of corporation thinking must be retested. If the
shareholders have virtually surrendered their power and "control" is unregulated we have fundamental questions to answer
as to whose interests we are to recognize in attempting some
form of regulation. Shall we recognize the interests of the
millions whose jobs and livelihood depend upon corporate employers? Shall we recognize the interests of the public at large,
the consumers whom every hour finds dependent upon some corporate product or service? To what extent shall we try to protect the corporate creditor and the holder of bonds and notes?
Shall we attempt.to recover for the shareholding owner some of
the powers he has lost? Shall we (and can we) reestablish him
as the sovereign of corporate government? How much are we
to emphasize each of these interests, and how are we to provide them with practical legal sanctions? These questions lie
stretched across the fields of almost all social sciences, but the
main burden of them rests squarely on the law. To the extent
that the lawyer is bigger than a pleader in a particular dispute
he must be aware of their responsibility and conscious of his
duty to lead in their solution.
To say that The Modern Corporation and Private Property
illuminates these important problems is sufficient high praise
DANIEL JAMES.
for the book.
New York City.
Patent Rights For Scientific Discoveries. By C. J. Hamsom,
Gray's Inn, London; Bobbs-Merrill Co.

1930; Pp. 286.

Property rights for scientific discoveries furnish a unique
novel and fertile question in United States law. The question
has founded extensive controversy in both European countries
and in England; but has been only meagerly discussed here.

